Leading Horses to Water: May Courts Which Have the Power to Order Attendance at Mediation Also Require Good-Faith Negotiation - Decker v. Lindsay by McPheeters, Charles J.
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 1992 Issue 2 Article 6 
1992 
Leading Horses to Water: May Courts Which Have the Power to 
Order Attendance at Mediation Also Require Good-Faith 
Negotiation - Decker v. Lindsay 
Charles J. McPheeters 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles J. McPheeters, Leading Horses to Water: May Courts Which Have the Power to Order Attendance 
at Mediation Also Require Good-Faith Negotiation - Decker v. Lindsay, 1992 J. Disp. Resol. (1992) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss2/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized editor 
of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
LEADING HORSES TO WATER:
MAY COURTS







There is a tacit assumption in the world of litigation that some cases can be
settled, while other cases cannot.2 But, of course, the simple fact that a case can
be settled does not mean that it will be settled. This raises some questions: Of
those cases which can reach a conclusion without litigation, how many will
actually do so? And what, if anything, should the legal system do to facilitate the
settlement of such cases?
3
Settlement is a favorite of the law,4 and courts encourage it as a social good
which may even outweigh other important policy considerations.5 Reasons for
this favoritism include a desire to avoid the time-consuming uncertainty and cost
of litigation,6 settlement's contributions to the efficient use of the court system,7
and a general wish for peaceful resolution of controversies.
1. 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
2. William M. Levine, Matrimonial Arbitration: An Option For the 90's, MASS. LAW. WKLY.,
Mar. 25, 1991, at 5.
3. See Diana C. Bork, Reasonable Legal Reform, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 17. But see
Bob Gibbins, Propositions Built on Myth, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1991, at 17.
4. Williams v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 582, 595 (1910).
5. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Telles, 663 S.W.2d 91 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). InHernandez, vigorous
policies against deceptive business practices gave way to the stronger policy favoring settlement and
compromise of claims. Id. at 93.
6. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976 (1972).
7. Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 465 (1984).
8. Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 428-29 (1986).
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The quest for speedy and efficient justice may be as old as the first dispute
- it has certainly been a fixture on the American legal horizon, at least since
Judge Learned Hand more than fifty years ago opined, "As a litigant, I should
dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death." 9 The
search has led to statutes,'0 court decisions," and commentary2 which debate
a broadening of judicial power that might include a more active role in directing
parties toward settlement. But how active can the courts be? And what role can
courts assume in encouraging orderly settlement when one or both parties are
adamantly litigious? It will be the scope of this Note to explore the limits of that
expanding role, and to show how some courts have defined its boundaries.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs brought suit in a Texas District Court over a rear-end car collision,
claiming economic and medical damages. '" They planned to prosecute the matter
through trial. " The district judge, on October 18, 1991, ordered the parties to
mediate. 5 She based her order on the Texas statute authorizing a court to refer
pending matters to alternative dispute resolution procedures (ADR) either by its
own motion or by motion of a party. 6 The judge did not consult with either
party before ordering mediation in the case.' 7
9. Irving R. Kaufman, The Public's Right to Speedier Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1987, at 39,
col. 2.
10. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. I (establishing that the rules of civil procedure should be
"construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action").
11. See, e.g., G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
This case allows "a pretrial magistrate to compel a represented litigant to attend pretrial conferences
with 'full authority to settle.'" Thomas A. Tozer, The Heileman Power: Well-Honed Tool or Blunt
Instrument?, 66 IND. L.J. 977, 980 (1991) (quoting Heileman, 871 F.2d at 655 n.ll).
12. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
13. See Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 249.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 248.
16. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021 (West Supp. 1992). This section is entitled
"Referral of Pending Disputes for Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedure," and it reads as follows:
(a) A court may, on its own motion or the motion of a party, refer a pending dispute for
resolution by an alternative dispute resolution procedure including:
(1) an alternative dispute resolution system established under Chapter 26, Acts of the 68th
Legislature, Regular Session, 1983 (Article 2372aa, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes);
(2) a dispute resolution organization; or
(3) a nonjudicial and informally conducted forum for the voluntary settlement of citizens'
disputes through the intervention of an impartial third party, including those alternative dispute
resolution procedures described under this subchapter.
Id.
17. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021(b) ("The court shall confer with the
parties in the determination of the most appropriate alternative dispute resolution procedure."). But
see Downey v. Gregory, 757 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that while this chapter
contemplates that the court will confer with counsel before referral, no hearing is required).
2
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REQUIRING GOOD FAITH MEDIATION
The judge's order instructed the parties and their attorneys to "proceed in a
good faith effort to try to resolve this case.'18 The order indicated that while
parties can be ordered to attend a mediated settlement conference, they are not
bound by the outcome.19 It instructed the parties to pay for the mediator as part
of the court costs incident to the case.2' The judge's order bound each party and
their attorneys to the Rules of Mediation, which accompanied the order; 2 1 those
rules were to be made an explicit part of any agreement to mediate.22 The rules
added that "while no one is asked to commit to settle their dispute in advance of
mediation, all parties commit to participate in the proceedings in good faith with
the intention to settle, if at all possible. "23
Plaintiffs made a timely objection to the order, listing six reasons why
mediation was an inappropriate procedure for their case. 24  The objections
indicated that the lawsuit's simplicity and its expected short duration made it an
unlikely candidate for mediation, that plaintiff doubted the case could be settled,
and that plaintiff refused to pay mediator's fees as ordered by the court.' The
plaintiffs objected to a procedure which they said would compromise other
valuable rights available to them at trial and complained that the order was a
violation of both federal and Texas constitutions.26 The judge overruled
plaintiffs' objections to the order to mediate.27 Plaintiffs, now relators, sought
mandamus relief from the Texas Court of Appeals, reiterating their objections to
the mediation order.28
The court of appeals dismissed all of relators' objections, save one, as being
either misplaced or within the discretion of the trial judge. 29 The lone objection
seized by the Court as pertinent was the argument that the judge's order violated
18. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 248.
19. Id. at 249.
20. Id. at 248.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 248-49.
23. Id. at 249.
24. The objections listed were:
(1) the lawsuit arises out of a simple rear-end car collision, where the only issues are
negligence, proximate cause, and damages; (2) trial is likely to last for only two days;
(3) it is relators' opinion that mediation will not resolve the lawsuit, and they have not
agreed to pay fees to the mediator; (4) mediation may cause relators to compromise their
potential cause of action under the Stowers doctrine; (5) the law does not favor alternative
dispute resolution where one of the litigants objects to it and when the litigants have been
ordered to pay for it; and (6) court-ordered mediation, over the relators' objection and
at their cost, violates their right to due process under the fifth and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the Texas Constitution and their




27. Id. at 248.
28. Id. at 249.
29. Id. at 249-50.
19921
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the Texas Constitution's open courts provision by requiring negotiation.' The
appeals court conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that
when a party clearly indicates its wish not to negotiate a settlement of a dispute




While lawsuits in this country are not likely to drone on like Dickens'
celebrated case of Jarndyce and Jarndyce,32 the alarm is ringing over the
condition of our courts, both state and federal. 33 Some say overcrowded dockets
lead judges to become more interested in managing, and thereby settling,
cases. 34 In fact, it was not too long ago that a federal district judge remanded
a properly removed case to state court, citing an overcrowded docket."
While current voices are pleading the case for alternative dispute resolution
to cure the ills of an overburdened system,36 the concept of extra-judicial
alternatives to litigation has been with us for some time.37 For example,
30. Id. at 251; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
31. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 252.
32. Dickens unfolds this case as follows:
This scarecrow of a suit has, in course of time, become so complicated, that no man alive
knows what it means. The parties to it understand it least; but it has been observed that
no two Chancery lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming to a total
disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born into the cause;
innumerable young people have married into it; innumerable old people have died out of
it. Scores of persons have deliriously found themselves made parties in Jarndyce and
Jarndyce, without knowing how or why; whole families have inherited legendary hatreds
with the suit. The little plaintiff or defendant, who was promised a new rocking-horse
when Jarndyce and Jamdyce should be settled, has grown up, possessed himself of a real
horse, and trotted away into the other world, Fair wards of court have faded into
mothers and grandmothers; a long procession of Chancellors has come in and gone out;
the legion of bills in the suit have been transformed into mere bills of mortality; there are
not three Jamdyces left upon the earth perhaps, since old Tom Jamdyce in despair blew
his brains out at a coffee-house in Chancery-lane; but Jarndyce and Jarndyce still drags
its dreary length before the Court, perennially hopeless.
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 6-7 (Thomas Y. Crowell Company 1971) (1853).
33. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 65 (1985); E. Donald
Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 309 (1986).
34. Resnik, supra note 12, at 379.
35. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 339 (1976).
36. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 8, at 425-26.
37. See, e.g., Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 127 (1864).
[Vol. 1992, No.. 2
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REQUIRING GOOD FAITH MEDIATION
Wisconsin has had statutes since the early 19th Century which allowed for the use
of arbitrators instead of the courts in practically all civil actions.38
Alternatives to a trial's seemingly inevitable delay and expense can be
suggested39 or mandated.' They can come from the judiciary41 or the
legislature.42 The Supreme Court of Connecticut, for example, has said it is a
"proper exercise of the judicial office to suggest the expediency and practical
value of. . . settling suits."43 Further, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has
upheld the mandatory mediation provision of a farm mortgage moratorium
statute." In a system which has traditionally protected the right to litigate,
45
alternative methods are favorites of the law for the same reasons that settlement
is generally encouraged: both allow cases to be cleared from crowded dockets
and allow for "amicable solutions to controversies" to be reached.6
The United States Supreme Court says judicial activism47 of this type is
firmly within a court's inherent capacity to control the parties to a lawsuit, even
during the pre-trial period. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,48 the Court
approved a trial judge's broad powers to manage cases, authorizing trial courts
to impose sanctions for failure to comply with pre-trial orders.4 9 In National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,' the Court said that
dismissal of a case was a proper sanction for failure of a party to comply with a
discovery order.51 State courts have also approved broad powers of judges to
control parties during pre-trial phases, sometimes invoking statutes52 and other
38. For a brief history of the Wisconsin statutes, see Knickerbocker v. Beaudette Garage Co.,
209 N.W. 763, 764-65 (Wis. 1926).
39. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 665 (West Supp. 1990). This statute says, in
relevant part, that "the court may, in any case under this subchapter, at any time refer the parties to
mediation on any issues." Id. (emphasis added).
40. MINN. STAT. § 583.26 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
41. Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 336 F. Supp. 1149, 1166 (N.D. Ill. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 471 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 917 (1973).
42. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021.
43. Krattenstein v. G. Fox & Co., 236 A.2d 466, 469 (Conn. 1967).
44.. Laue v. Production Credit Ass'n, 390 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). But see
Federal Land Bank v. Bott, 732 P.2d 710, 718 (Kan. 1987) (ruling mortgage moratorium statutes are
unconstitutional impairments of contracts); Federal Land Bank v. Story, 756 P.2d 588, 591-93 (Okla.
1988) (same).
45. Tozer, supra note 11, at 991.
46. D. L. Spillman, Jr., Annotation, Judge's Comments - Urging Settlement, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457,
1459 (1966).
47. See generally Resnik, supra note 12.
48. 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
49. Id. at 764-67.
50. 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam).
51. Id. at 643.
52. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 587 A.2d 463 (Me. 1991), for its discussion of ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 665.
1992]
5
McPheeters: McPheeters: Leading Horses to Water:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 1992, No. 2
times citing general rules of jurisprudence.53 This supervisory power of the
court has been used to compel parties to mediate.1
4
B. Ordering ADR
However, such judicial control may have its limits. The Seventh Circuit
recently held in Strandell v. Jackson Count 5 that the power of a federal court
under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6 does not extend to
compelling parties to submit to summary jury trials, 7 which are a form of ADR.
It is possible that this limitation may be firmly circumscribed. A commentator
argues that the holding in this case should be confined to summary jury trials,
which differ significantly from other forms of ADR and settlement
negotiations."8
Texas' statute59 allows courts to refer pending disputes to certain authorized
ADR proceedings. 6' The suggestion of ADR proceedings may come from any
party to the action,6' or from the court itself.62 However, even if ADR is
suggested by the parties, the court is not bound to refer the matter.63 The statute
does require a court to confer with the parties before choosing an appropriate
method of resolving the dispute.('
53. See, e.g., Gardner v. Mobil Oil Co., 31 Cal. Rptr. 731, 734 (Ct. App. 1963).
54. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. National Mediation Bd.,
425 F.2d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1970); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local No. 323 v. Coral
Elec. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 1128, 1136-37 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Iron Workers Local 790 v. Bostron-
Bergman, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2633 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
55. 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 1987).
56. The relevant portion of this rule states: "In any action, the court may in its discretion direct
the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or
conferences before trial for such purposes as ... (5) facilitating the settlement of the case." FED. R.
Ctv. P. 16(a). See also FED R. CIv. P. 16(c), which states that "[t]he participants at any conference
under this rule may consider and take action with respect to . (7) the possibility of settlement or
the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute."
57. See William E. Craco, Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges to Order
Summary Jury Trial Participation, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 483 (1988). The author argues that because
the scope of the power of the judiciary is not specifically limited in the area of mandating alternative
dispute resolution, Rule 16 should be given the broadest possible reading. Id. at 491-95. Coupled
with the federal court's "inherent powers . . . to control their own dockets and provide for efficient
management of their caseloads," the broad authority of Rule 16 does allow courts to compel some
forms of ADR. Id. at 497. Summary jury trials are, however, distinguished from other types of
settlement procedures. Id. at 483 n.l, 485 n.9.
58. See id. at 494-95.
59. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021.
60. Id. § 154.021(a).
61. Downey, 757 S.W.2d at 525.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021(b).
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1992, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1992/iss2/6
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The emphasis on settling cases before trial raises some concerns from the
bench over the proper role of the courts. Is a court's "encouragement" of
mediation and settlement simply a euphemism for "ordering" settlement?' In
Connecticut, the state high court says
[i]t is a proper exercise of the judicial office to suggest the expediency
and practical value of adjusting differences and compromising and
settling suits at law. The efficient administration of the courts is
subserved by the ending of disputes without the delay and expense of
a trial, and the philosophy or ideal of justice is served in the amicable
solution of controversies.6
But a California court, in Rosenfield v. Vosper,67 has warned
[ajlthough efforts on the part of a trial judge to expedite proceedings
and to encourage settlements out of court are ordinarily to be
commended, such efforts should never be so directed as to compel
either litigant to make a forced settlement.'
In that case, the trial judge frequently admonished the attorneys that the case
should be settled; he twice held conferences in his chambers in which he insisted
that the defendant's attorneys impress upon their client the judge's belief that the
case should be settled for $7,500.69 The dissent admitted that the judge may
have been injudicious but said that the indiscretion did not warrant reversal.70
Other courts appear to agree with the Rosenfield dissent. In Chiappetta v.
LeBlond,7' a Maine superior court judge sanctioned a television repair shop
customer for refusing to settle.' The case was being heard on remand following
an earlier trial in which the repair shop won.' The Maine Supreme Court
expressly stated that a trial court not only has the authority to impose sanctions
for abuse of the litigation process, but also that such a decision would be
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.74 Determining just when
encouragement becomes coercion is such a fact-specific issue that Justice Traynor
said that no judicial misconduct case of this type can ever be a controlling
65. See, e.g., Gullett v. McCormick, 421 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) ("the problem of the
extent to which a trial court ... may encourage settlement of an action is a delicate one").
66. Krattenstein, 236 A.2d at 469.
67. 114 P.2d 29 (Cal. Ct. App 1941).
68. Id. at 33.
69. Id.
70. Id. (Moore, P.J., dissenting).
71. 544 A.2d 759 (Me. 1988).
72. Id. at 760.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 760-61. However, the Maine Supreme Court dismissed the sanctions in Chiappetta due
to the failure to show that the parties had negotiated in bad faith. Id. at 761.
19921
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precedent for any other case.75 The only guidelines seemingly available in case
law are general admonishments that "a trial court ought not to force a settlement
on a party who wants a trial, but there is nothing wrong or irregular in a court
suggesting the advisability of settlement. "76
Indeed, parties as well as judges are forbidden from using undue pressure
to force a settlement upon an opposing party. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine in Bennett v. Bennett77 was faced with a litigant who moved to compel
his ex-spouse to sign an alleged "agreement" between them.7" The court said
that ordering the spouse to sign "is contrary to and would undermine the basic
policy of the mediation process that parties be encouraged to arrive at a settlement
of disputed issues without the intervention of the court."79
C. The Good Faith Requirement
In those cases in which mediation can be ordered by a court,' the judge
may require the parties to operate in good faith.8 ' However, courts have often
had trouble defining "good faith." Even a court applying a statutory standard of
"good faith" has decided that it "is a term incapable of precise definition."82
Courts agree that the standard is fact-intensive and is best determined on a case-
by-case basis using the broad discretion of the trial court.8 3
Still, courts have enunciated guidelines to describe a good faith effort.
Courts will require a party to engage "actively . . . in the bargaining process with
an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement. "' Other opinions rely
on the common usage of the term "good faith" to require litigants to have
"honesty of purpose, [and] freedom from intention to defraud. "I
It is the emphasis on faimess' and honest dealing which seems to be the
common thread through most definitions of good faith, whether statutory or
judge-made. Pennsylvania's Uniform Fiduciary Act" says that "[a] thing is
done in 'good faith'. . . when it is in fact done honestly."88 The Florida
75. Weil v. Weil, 236 P.2d 159, 167 (Cal. 1951).
76. Washington v. Sterling, 91 A.2d 844 (D.C. 1952).
77. 587 A.2d 463 (Me. 1991).
78. Id. at 464.
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 39-79 and accompanying text.
81. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 336 F. Supp. at 1168.
82. In re Love, 957 F.2d 1350, 1355 (7th Cir. 1992).
83. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 1982).
84. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 214 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Mich. 1974).
85. Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251 (Ct. App. 1967).
86. Love, 957 F.2d at 1357. In its effort to define "good faith," the Seventh Circuit in this case
said the standard was one of "fundamental fairness," but went on to admit that such a definition was
no great improvement in clarity. Id.
87. 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6351-6404 (Supp. 1992).
88. Id. § 6351(2).
[Vol. 1992, No. 2
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Supreme Court, reviewing a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney who
refused a court order for religious reasons, defined good faith as "'an honest
belief.., and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry .... [It is] that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose
. . . and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or
obligation.'- 8 9
The fact that courts may order parties to mediate or to bargain does not
require the participants to reach any agreement. 90 Such an order requires only
that "the parties manifest such an attitude and conduct that will be conducive to
reaching an agreement."91 If a plan is proposed with honest intentions, a court
will find that the good faith standard is satisfied so long as there is a basis to
expect success. 92
It is not a controlling factor that mediation might fail to resolve the issue.93
Parties whose failure is accompanied by a good faith effort are held harmless.
Some local federal court rules impose sanctions for bad faith efforts when a party
rejects the outcome of an alternative mechanism but fails substantially to improve
her position at trial.'
Interestingly, in the search for a definition of "good faith," some courts
resort to saying it is whatever is not "bad faith," by which they mean "dishonest
purpose... conscious doing of wrong ... [or] breach of a known duty through
some motive of interest or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It means
'with actual intent to mislead or deceive another."' 95
The Ohio Supreme Court has looked at good faith in the settlement
context.96 In a case involving an automobile collision, the court said a party has
not failed to use good faith in settlement attempts so long as the party has fully
cooperated in discovery, has rationally evaluated risks and liabilities, and has not
attempted to delay the proceedings unnecessarily. 7 The court added a fourth
criterion of making or responding to a "good faith monetary settlement offer. "98
This element was soundly criticized by the dissent for creating a circular
definition - interpreting "good faith" by using the term "good faith."'
89. Florida Bar v. Jackson, 494 So. 2d 206, 209 (Fla. 1986) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
623-24 (5th ed. 1979)).
90. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 336 F. Supp at 1166.
91. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 214 N.W.2d at 808.
92. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 649 (2d Cir. 1988).
93. Production Credit Ass'n v. Spring Water Dairy Farm, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 15 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986), aff'd, 407 N.W.2d 88 (Minn. 1987).
94. A. Leo Levin & Dierdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts,
37 FLA. L. REV. 29, 55-56 (1985).
95. Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 187 N.E.2d 45,48 (Ohio 1962) (quoting Spiegel v. Beacon
Participations, Inc., 8 N.E.2d 895, 907 (Mass. 1937)).
96. Kalain v. Smith, 495 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1986).
97. Id. at 574.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 575 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting).
19921
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On the other end of the spectrum is the Texas court which defines "good
faith" as the opposite of "bad faith." 0 0 The court said "bad faith" implied
fraud, deception, or a refusal to abide by a duty owed to another, generally
prompted by a "sinister motive. " "'
Statutes have also been used to impose good faith negotiating requirements
on parties in mediation. The Minnesota Farm Creditor Mediation Act,t° 2 for
example, requires a mediator to file an affidavit whenever a party operates outside
the bounds of good faith. °3 It should be noted that not all farm credit
mediation acts require good faith negotiation."0
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The Texas Court of Appeals put the question succinctly: "Can a party be
compelled to participate in an alternative dispute resolution procedure despite its
objections? "1  The court's answer was no.
The relators in Decker v. Lindsay put forward six reasons why they should
not be compelled to submit to mediation. 0" The trial judge overruled the
relators' first three reasons, and the appellate court subsequently upheld the lower
court's ruling."° Relators argued that their case was one of limited issues, that
it would take no longer than a mediation procedure would take, and that
mediation would not resolve the lawsuit.10 8  The court noted discrepancies
between these objections and the record, which indicated a trial of some
complexity, as well as an estimated trial time of up to four days. 09 The court
also pointed out that the real party in interest desired mediation."0
The Texas appeals court further disposed of the relators' other objections.
As to the objection that they would be forced to pay for the costs of a procedure
to which they objected, the court noted that the court-appointed mediator had
waived her fee."' Therefore, the issue was moot. The court also dismissed
relators contention they would sacrifice their Stowers rights." 2 The Stowers
Principle is the Texas version of the doctrine that an insurer has a duty to settle
100. Thrift v. Johnson, 561 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977).
101. Id.
102. MINN. STAT. §§ 583.20-583.32 (1989 & Supp. 1993).
103. Id. § 583.27(2).
104. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 654A (1990). For a complete look at agricultural loan mediation,
see Donna L. Malter, Comment, Avoiding Farm Foreclosure through Mediation ofAgricultural Loan
Disputes, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 335 (1991).
105. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 248.






112. Id. at 250.
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a lawsuit when an ordinarily prudent person would do so.113 Failure to settle
under those circumstances makes the insurer liable to the insured for any damages
awarded in excess of policy limits."4 The Decker court pointed out that the
relator's invocation of Stowers was premature," 5 since under Texas law,
Stowers rights do not accrue until final judgment. 116
Relators contended that Texas law premised its ADR procedures on the basis
of willing participants, and that compelled ADR is not within the scope of the
code. ' But, in response, the court drew the distinction between a party's
attendance at an ADR proceeding and that party's participation in the proceeding
itself." 8 While a court cannot order parties to settle, or even to negotiate, it
can at least order them to sit down across the table from one another. I" While
a party may oppose the order on "reasonable" grounds, 2 the trial judge
determines reasonableness. Therefore, said the appeals court, unreasonable
objections cannot be the basis for forgoing ADR proceedings. 2 '
Since Texas law favors a policy of peaceable resolution of disputes,
2 2
trial courts have the power to order parties to attend ADR proceedings.
12 3
Furthermore, since the trial judge determines the reasonableness of any objections
to her order, the law is satisfied when a court requires disputants to meet in a
procedure designed to help them settle their differences. 24  But the appeals
court drew a bright line at that point, forbidding a trial judge from ordering
anything more than attendance at an ADR proceeding.'25
The language of the trial judge's order required the parties not only to
attend, but also to participate in mediation.' 26 The order commanded the
parties to "proceed in a good faith effort to try to resolve this case. "127 This,
said the appeals court, "does not comport with the scheme set forth in [the
code]." 28  Because of this non-conformity with the policy objectives of the
applicable code sections, the appeals court ordered the trial judge to vacate those
113. See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Ct. App.
1929).
114. Id.
115. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 250.
116. Street v. Honorable Second Court of Appeals, 756 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1988).
117. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 250-51.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.022(c) (1987).
121. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 250.
122. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.002 (1987).
123. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 250.
124. Id. at 251.
125. Id. at 250-51.
126. Id. at 249.
127. Id. at 248.
128. Id. at 251.
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portions of her order requiring good faith negotiations."' The court indicated
that whenever one party objects to ADR proceedings because it prefers to take its
case to trial, that party cannot be ordered to negotiate its underlying dispute. 3 '
V. COMMENT
If it were possible to determine ahead of time which disputes required
litigation and which could be settled by some other means, many lawyers would
go hungry. That has not stopped the search for more efficient and effective ways
to determine which lawsuits should proceed to trial and which should not. At
least one commentator has attempted to reduce to mathematical precision the exact
point at which a party to a lawsuit will forgo litigation.' But not even a
Posner equation can take into account all of the possible variables which go into
such a decision. 132 It is left in the hands of litigants, lawyers, and judges to
weigh these factors on a case-by-case basis to decide when to try, and when to
settle, a case. If the decision is left to the reasoned notions of the parties, then
deciding to mediate a case can overcome any number of perceived problems in
the legal system.' But when judges alone become such a large part of the
equation that the wishes of the parties are rendered meaningless, the legal system
should tremble. "
Perhaps the greatest fear of judicial intervention is that a judge's involvement
in the decision to mediate may rise to the level of coercion."' "Tools forged
to expedite trials and eliminate abuses were being abused themselves in order to
coerce settlements and bring cases to their knees." 36 And even if the bench has
the best intentions, any entry by a judge into settlement matters can appear to be
coercive;'37 "[t]o deny the existence of this coercive atmosphere is to ignore
reality." 13
Yet the mechanisms for directing would-be litigants to alternative resolution
methods must often involve judicial intervention. 19 Indeed, judges have been
129. Id. at 252.
130. Id. at 250-52.
131. Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1986). Judge Posner created
a model for his prediction, based on the amount of a plaintiff's demand in relation to the defendant's
offer of compromise. Id. at 369-70.
132. Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337 (1986). Schuck analyzes the results of injecting judges into the
settlement process, an element which is not factored into Posner's equations. Id. at 348-59.
133. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
134. Tozer, supra note 11, at 987-88.
135. H. Lee Sarokin, Justice Rushed is Justice Ruined, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 431, 435 (1986).
136. Id. at 432.
137. Id. at 435.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021(a).
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encouraged to explore ADR mechanisms. Justice Anthony Kennedy says
alternatives to traditional litigation must be studied if for no other reason than that
their existence implies deficiencies in the present legal system."4 Who better
than an impartial observer to assess the merits of a referral to mediation? But
what should be the scope of that referral?
In G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., "' the court approved
an action by a magistrate judge which ordered a litigant to provide a
representative at settlement conferences with "full authority to settle." Under the
facts of Heileman, this apparently meant "the power to write a check." 42 The
power thus granted to the magistrate judge in Heileman has been criticized as well
beyond the traditional role of the judiciary. 143 Commentators have also said that
this newly created "Heileman Power" is a troubling step into coercion.'"
A much different situation is encountered under the facts of Decker v.
Lindsay. In Decker, the trial court required attendance and participation in a
mediation session.'45 It also required that the parties "proceed in a good faith
effort to try to resolve this case."14 There was nothing of Heileman's thinly
veiled order to compromise, merely a requirement of good faith negotiation.
Where in Heileman the parties had been in litigation for some time and, in fact,
had appealed the case twice, the Decker litigants had yet to have their day in
court. While the Heileman court never specified what it required of the litigant's
"authorized representative,"147 Judge Lindsay clearly required the litigants to act
in "good faith. "148
One clear purpose of promoting mediation and other forms of ADR is to
relieve courts of overcrowding. 149  Whether mediation is accomplished by
"farming out" the process,' 5 ° or as part of a "multi-door courthouse" approach
140. News in Brief: Alternative Dispute Resolution, 58 U.S.L.W. 2129, 2130 (Aug. 29, 1989).
The comments by Justice Kennedy were made at an ADR program held during the 1989 ABA
meeting. Id.
141. 871 F.2d 648.
142. Tozer, supra note 11, at 981 n.13.
143. Id. at 987-88.
144. See id. at 996 (stating that the argument that "an order compelling a represented litigant to
appear with full authority to settle is not the same as an order to settle ... is a merely semantic
distinction"); see also Eric D. Bender, Note, So It's Settled Then - Rule 16 and Courts' Power to
Order Represented Parties to Attend Pretrial Settlement Conferences, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1421
(1990).
145. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 248.
146. Id.
147. Tozer, supra note 11, at 9 8 1.
148. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 248.
149. Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. - A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D.
79, 94 (1976).
150. The Texas courts' procedure illuminated in Decker is a prime example of a system which
"farms out" the dispute resolution process. The court has no personnel on staff to handle such duties,
so an independent mediator is chosen to handle the dispute. The mediator usually charges a fee,
although in this case the fee was waived. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
19921
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to ADR, 5' it is expected to ease our backlog of litigation. 52  What possible
purpose, then, is served by allowing a judge to order attendance at mediation, but
not participation? This simply adds one superfluous level of activity to an already
crowded system. It allows the parties to take up the valuable time of a trained
(and probably court-appointed) mediator, while all the time simply postponing
what the recalcitrant party desires as the inevitable - his day in court.
Such a system overload is costly and inefficient and can create a two-tiered
backlog - one in traditional litigation, the other in alternative dispute methods.
Efforts directed toward settlement of a case may be no less a drain on the system
than is litigation."5 3 Posner, in fact, complains that "subsidizing" settlement
through court-sponsored ADR is likely to increase the costs incurred in the system
while it decreases the litigation caseload.
15 4
In the first Heileman decision, 5 5 the district court said that it was a
"misuse of [an expensive public resource] for any party to refuse even to meet
personally with the opposing party or its counsel to attempt to resolve their
disputes prior to trial." 56  Use of this expensive resource is a privilege, say
proponents of ADR, which carries with it certain obligations, including the
efficient use of the resource.'57 If the referral to mediation is designed to
protect the litigation system from abuse and overuse, then the mediation system
must be granted the same protections. Otherwise we simply move, and do not
remove, the problem. It is patently inefficient to command, or even to allow, a
party to attend mediation without a parallel directive to make efficient use of this
alternative resource.
Under Texas law, a party may make its own motion to refer a case to
mediation.' Absent reasonable objections from the other side, the case is
usually referred as a matter of course. 15 The Texas appeals court in Decker
would apparently allow an opposing party, even without reasonable objections,
to frustrate the mediation process through failure to exercise good faith. "6 Such
an approach is inimical to the idea that mediation should be based on the building
151. First proposed by Professor Frank E.A. Sander, this concept views "the courthouse of the
future as a dispute resolution center offering an array of options for the resolution of legal disputes.
Litigation would be one option among many including conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and
ombudspeople." Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein, The Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse,
37 CATH. U. L. REV. 577, 577 (1988).
152. Lambros, supra note 7, at 465.
153. Posner, supra note 131, at 373.
154. Id.
155. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis. 1985), rev'd,
848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988).
156. Id. at 277.
157. See Tozer, supra note 11, at 980 n.ll.
158. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.021(a); Downey, 757 S.W.2d at 525.
159. Richard Connelly, Mediation Law Loses Some Leverage, TEX. LAW., Jan. 20, 1992, at 1.
160. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 251 ("Chapter 154 contemplates mandatory referral only, not
mandatory negotiation.").
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of trust among the parties. 6 ' It is likely to cause both sides to expend more
money 162 and to get less for it. The moving party in such a scenario is more
likely to harden her stance after encountering the lack of good faith, and there is
no incentive for the recalcitrant party to adjust her position if good faith is not
required.
The Decker court apparently believes that a judge may never require good
faith. Other courts disagree and see nothing wrong with requiring parties to
conduct themselves in such a way that agreement is possible.163  By the same
token, it is clear that courts cannot make agreement of the parties a condition of
an order to mediate."6 The Decker court apparently concluded that requiring
good faith meant requiring agreement, but this conclusion is countered by the very
words of Judge Lindsay's order: "[rieferral to mediation is not a substitute for
trial, and the case will be tried if not settled. "165
The requirement of "good faith" may be a nebulous standard,' 66 but there
are guideposts by which to travel. Participants must approach the mediation with
an open mind, not hardened to the point where the process becomes
worthless. 67 The recalcitrant party is only required to consider the possibility
of reaching agreement. Participants must attend without any attempt to defraud
the other party; 161 they must be fundamentally fair in their dealings with the
opposing side. 169  The Decker court appears to believe that such requirements
are antagonistic to the concept of justice and that Judge Lindsay's order did more
than require parties to meet fairly, with open minds, devoid of fraudulent
intent. 170
Good faith negotiation is not the equivalent of agreement, is not a synonym
for settlement, and does not require any particular outcome.' 7 ' Courts readily
admit that referral to mediation carries no guarantee of settlement."n All that
they can require is that parties make an effort to reach agreement. 17
161. Levin & Golash, supra note 94, at 40 (defining mediation as "conciliation of a dispute");
see also Lieberman & Henry, supra note 8, at 428-29; Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers,
43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 43-48 (1982).
162. In this case, however, the mediator waived her standard fee. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 249.
The court in Decker points out that fee waiver is a standard procedure whenever one of the parties
objects to the referral or the payment of fees. Id. at 251.
163. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 214 N.W.2d at 808.
164. Chiappetta, 544 A.2d at 761.
165. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 248 (emphasis added).
166. See supra notes 80-104 and accompanying text.
167. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 214 N.W.2d at 808.
168. Efron, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 251.
169. Love, 957 F.2d at 1357.
170. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 251.
171. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 336 F. Supp. at 1166.
172. Spring Water Dairy, 392 N.W.2d at 17.
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But what effect does such a requirement have on the other party - the one
who prefers trial to the alternative? This is a fair question. Non-judicial, off-the-
record methods of settlement are problematic for a party who unwillingly must
submit. Even if some sort of agreement is reached, there is little likelihood of
appeal.'74 Certainly, the mediated settlement may have come cheaper and
quicker than a trial, but for the unwilling party "speedy injustice is not an
improvement over slow justice." 175
The saving grace for the unwilling is that consent is voluntary. In mediation
the parties take advantage of the "non-coercive intervention of a third party."176
Some critics disagree and have disparaged alternative methods and settlement in
general as inherently coercive. "Like plea bargaining, settlement is a capitulation
to the conditions of mass society and should be neither encouraged nor
praised. " 7  In essence, a good-faith requirement does nothing more than
expose the unwilling party to an alternative; she loses nothing and may gain
considerably by active participation. The Posner models indicate that anything
which closes the gap between the defendant's and the plaintiff's assessment of a
victory for the plaintiff is likely to aid in settlement.' The process of
mediation, in which a neutral facilitates a shared solution, allows the parties to
assess virtually all of the variables in the equation without being bound to the
outcome. As even the unwilling party puts only the chance for success on the
line, and not the chance for failure, she loses nothing through a good faith
approach to negotiation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Access to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms should be as jealously
guarded as access to the courts. If not, the overcrowding crisis which faces some
174. Tozer, supra note 11, at 989 n.54.
175. Id. at 979.
176. Levin & Golash, supra note 94, at 40 (emphasis added).
177. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). Such an assessment
is perhaps too harsh. While Professor Fiss' analysis might be pertinent to the class of cases about
which he was particularly concerned, such as corporate litigation, it seems out of place in the context
of the Decker case. Fiss complains that proponents of ADR view every case as a "quarrel[] between
neighbors." Id. at 1075. But Decker fits nicely into that mold -- an automobile accident between
parties of relatively equal economic strength, with no real problems of imbalance of power or lack of
authority. See id. at 1076-82.
178. The formulae are:
"PpJ - C + S < PdJ + C-S
or, equivalently, if
(Pp - Pd)J < 2(C - S).
Pp is the probability of the plaintiff's victory as the plaintiff perceives it; Pd the probability of the
plaintiff's victory as the defendant perceives it; J the judgment for the plaintiff if he wins; C the cost
of trial (assumed to be the same for both parties); and S the cost of settlement (also assumed to be the
same for both parties)." Posner, supra note 131, at 369-70.
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courthouses will be simply moved down the hall or around the block. In addition,
requiring parties to attend mediation without also requiring them to participate
meaningfully in the process does nothing to alleviate the stresses on our courts
that trigger ADR. Litigious parties, grudgingly attending mediation sessions,
need only bide their time to return to their preferred forum. The courtroom
crowding may go away, but only for a short while.
If we accept that mediation and other forms of ADR are useful, then we
must encourage meaningful participation. While courts cannot be allowed to
coerce settlement, requirements of good faith negotiation do nothing of the sort.
Rather, they make possible the efficient and effective use of our alternative
procedures, while at the same time allowing those procedures to assist in the
efficient and effective use of our courts.
CHARLES J. MCPHEETERS
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